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IN THE NAME OF PLURALISM: FIGHTING THE (PERCEIVED) ULTRA-
ORTHODOX PENETRATION IN THE BAKA NEIGHBORHOOD OF 
JERUSALEM 
 
ABSTRACT 
In Jerusalem the term pluralism recently received an alternative meaning – non-Haredi. 
Conflicts between the “pluralist” and the Ultra-Orthodox populations regarding the 
character of city neighborhoods are quite frequent. The focus of this article is one 
Jerusalem neighborhood – Baka – and the conflicts that occurred there around this issue 
in 2009–10. Neighborhood residents interpreted and framed the conflicts as opposition 
to Ultra-Orthodox penetration, but I argue, relying on ethnographic data analysis of two 
conflicts, that the main focus was the definition of the public space. As these conflicts 
involved Ultra-Orthodox and organizations, in the sensitive context of Jerusalem, 
framing them as anti-Ultra-Orthodox penetration was useful in mobilizing residents‟ 
participation and in gaining wider legitimation and support. More broadly, based on my 
ethnography, I argue that residents participate in neighborhood affairs due to sentiments 
of belonging and commitment, thus creating the political format I term “neighborhood 
citizenship”. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In August 2011 a local playground in Baka, a neighborhood in South-Central Jerusalem, 
changed its usual appearance. Several inflatable bouncers were placed in in the 
playground where a large picture of the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menahem Mendel 
Schneerson, the deceased rabbi of Chabad was displayed. Yellow chain flags with the 
word “Messiah” written on them and a drawing of a crown were also hung (the Rebbe is 
considered by his followers to be the Messianic king, even after his death, chosen by god 
to bring redemption to the world). Crowds filled this local public space, coloring it with 
unusual quantities of the black and white outfits of Haredi people. Many Haredi families 
attended, most of whom were not from Baka. Many local families, religious or secular, 
also came and entertained their children with some bouncing and cotton candy. 
On regular days, Baka is not an Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) neighborhood. It is a 
small neighborhood, in size and population: covering less than half a square kilometer 
with only an estimated 7,500 inhabitants. Baka was built in the late nineteenth century by 
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wealthy Palestinians, forced out during the 1948 war. The abandoned Palestinian homes 
were declared “absentee properties” and were re-populated by new Jewish immigrants 
from Muslim countries and post-war Europe, government employees, military veterans, 
and evacuees from the Jewish neighborhoods damaged in the war. The spacious houses 
were divided into small units, replacing the wealth of the past with human density and 
poverty. The 1967 war was a turning point for Baka as the new city borders turned it into 
an inner-city neighborhood. A new architectural trend that saw value in its historic, 
authentic “character”1 attracted middle-class Israelis and a gentrification process began. 
When the demand for Baka properties grew, new buildings sprung up and even the 
poorly built housing developments of the 1960s were gentrified. From the 1990s, Baka 
became a prestigious neighborhood. It is currently undergoing super-gentrification – 
when the upper class pushes out the middle-class.2 
The majority of Baka‟s population today is religious-Zionist and secular. It is a 
“pluralistic” neighborhood in the sense of what “pluralism” had come to mean in 
Jerusalem: non-Haredi. The unique social composition of Jerusalem pushed residents to 
form unusual alliances. Thus, in Jerusalem, non-Haredi Jews, a group marked by great 
diversity, became a new social group, “pluralistic” in the sense of their acceptance of 
other people‟s lifestyles, without trying to enforce their own. 
During the time of my research (2008–13), Baka had experienced several local 
conflicts over various issues. What tended to motivate these conflicts, I argue, was a 
sentiment of threat. One threat was Ultra-Orthodox penetration. Another source was 
“the big money” – investors seeking large profits by building luxurious housing units, 
thus making Baka unaffordable for many and changing the composition of 
neighborhood residents. A third source was the Jerusalem Municipality‟s plans for the 
neighborhood in terms of transportation or the future development of the area, which 
appeared to residents as contrary to their interests and harmful to their quality of life. 
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Neighborhood residents perceived these three sources as threatening the neighborhood‟s 
character, and acted accordingly. 
Jerusalem is a contested city, divided – culturally and geographically – between 
three populations: Palestinians, Ultra-Orthodox, and “pluralist Jews”. All tend to see the 
others as threatening, while at the same time trying to expand their own “territories”. 
The public space, representing the social composition of a neighborhood and defining its 
future course, thus becomes a battlefield. In this context, even small acts like a Chabad-
sponsored family event may have explosive outcomes. After all, it is Chabad‟s 
operational principal to “begin with one Jew at a time”, “meet clients where they are”, 
and “claim the street”.3 Their representatives go everywhere to spread their agenda, 
especially places that are non-Haredi, like Baka. Religious politics is often driven by fear 
and is deeply connected with space and with people‟s perceptions of what the public 
space could or should include. For instance, conflicts regarding women‟s veiling or 
minarets in Europe are driven by disagreements regarding the visibility of the public 
space and the fear that liberal inclusion would lead to Islamization.4 
Through the ethnographic analysis of two local conflicts in 2009–10, I argue that 
the fear of Ultra-Orthodox penetration has been utilized to increase participation. 
Publicly framing a conflict as opposition to Ultra-Orthodox penetration mobilizes people 
to act, motivated by a desire to safeguard the public space and the identity of their 
neighborhood. I argue that participation in neighborhood affairs is motivated by people‟s 
sentiments of belonging and commitment. Such participation creates the political format 
I term “neighborhood citizenship”. 
The next section describes the research methodology. I then turn to discuss the 
background of the “pluralist”–Haredi conflict in Jerusalem; the urban apparatus of 
Community Councils, unique to Jerusalem; Baka‟s Community Council and local 
activists; and the theoretical framework of this article, namely the concept of 
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“neighborhood citizenship”. The following sections address the two case studies: the 
conflict regarding the takeover of public lands in the neighborhood by an Ultra-
Orthodox NGO and the conflict over the operation of a Chabad summer camp in the 
premises of Baka‟s Community Council. I conclude by discussing the arguments. 
METHODOLOGY 
My long ethnographic fieldwork in Baka, during 2008–13, was possible due to my 
residency in the neighborhood then. In the course of my fieldwork, I conducted 100 
formal interviews as well as many informal conversations, including neighborhood 
residents, community leaders, religious laypeople, merchants, architects, realtors, local 
politicians, and neighborhood activists. Many respondents belonged to more than one 
category. My respondents included 40 Western immigrants, from the US, France, and 
Britain, who immigrated from the 1960s until the present. The majority of them (33 out 
of 40) were Orthodox (non-Haredi), although of different backgrounds and levels of 
practice. Among my 60 other respondents, 34 were secular or traditional Jews, 21 were 
religious from different streams of Judaism, and four were non-Jews. The respondents 
were found from personal networks or through the “snow ball” technique. 
Neighborhood residents were the majority of my respondents. 
My respondents included 13 neighborhood activists and elected volunteering 
board members of the Baka Community Council and 6 employees; 5 local activists (not 
from Baka); 4 municipal-level politicians; 4 Jerusalem Municipality employees; and 3 
members of the team that worked on Baka‟s new master plan. I asked activists about 
their activism, motivations, and views. Interviews with local politicians and with 
Community Council employees and the Municipality mainly focused on their work. 
I conducted numerous participant observations in contexts where representations 
of urban transformation, my research‟s focus, could be found – synagogues, parks, 
streets, supermarkets, cafés, shops, schools, private homes, and community institutions. I 
5 
attended many meetings, public discussions, and community activities in the Community 
Council, the Municipality, and the Planning Authority and took an active role in Baka‟s 
Urban Forum, where issues concerning the neighborhood‟s public space were discussed 
and decided upon. 
I sometimes entered these sites as a researcher, but generally gained access as a 
resident and activist. Most notes were written while I observed, in a notebook I carried 
everywhere, but when this was impossible, I made notes later. As my fieldwork was “at 
home”, issues of reflexivity and subjectivity, which anthropologists have been debating 
for decades, were particularly relevant. I was not “a fly on the wall”. My own positioning 
as a resident of the neighborhood, middle-class, secular, Israeli-born, mother of young 
children, and not the owner of my apartment, clearly influenced my research. 
Anthropologists acknowledge that anthropological findings (or “truths”) can only be 
partial, as they are delivered by individuals with unique positioning and worldviews.5 I did 
my best to include and represent as many voices as possible, in order to validate my 
analysis. 
In addition to interviews and participant observation, I followed newspaper 
articles on issues related to my research in nationwide and local newspapers and 
conducted online netnographic research6 that included various email correspondence, 
Facebook discussions, and new immigrants‟ forums. I gained access to several mailing 
lists, sometimes as an active resident. Much of this information correlated with my 
“offline” findings while adding substantial data. The netnographic research proved 
particularly useful in measuring and analyzing residents‟ participation in neighborhood 
affairs, not just because activists discussed and organized their activities online, but 
because much of the activity itself was performed online. 
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FEAR AND LOATHING IN JERUSALEM 
The fear of Ultra-Orthodox penetration is concrete for many Jerusalemites. The city‟s 
population in 2013 was just under 830 thousand inhabitants. Palestinians comprised 37% 
of the population, Ultra-Orthodox (self-definition) – 22%, and “pluralist Jews” (non-
Haredi) – 41%. The Jewish population of Jerusalem (63% in total) included 35% Ultra-
Orthodox, compared with 7% in the rest of Israel‟s Jewish population. The term “Ultra-
Orthodox” binds together diverse populations with different levels of observation, 
appearance, ethnic belonging, and religious beliefs. Jerusalem‟s “pluralist” Jews (65% of 
the Jewish population) are also diverse, and include 45% religious or traditional Jews and 
only 20% secular.7 It is also diverse in terms of ethnicity, religious practices, values and 
beliefs, political views, and socio-economic status. 
Spatially, the three major populations are separated into their own areas of the 
city. People know when they have entered the “other‟s” neighborhood by observing the 
public space that represents its character: the shops, streets, signs, architecture, and 
passersby‟s dress. The spatial status quo in Jerusalem is being breached as all groups 
penetrate other groups‟ spaces for permanent residency, thus creating social tensions. 
Palestinians penetrate Jewish neighborhoods,8 Religious right-wingers penetrate 
Palestinian neighborhoods,9 and the Ultra-Orthodox penetrate non-Haredi Jewish 
neighborhoods.10 The Ultra-Orthodox population is growing fast due to high natural 
increase. As the density of their neighborhoods is unbearable, they are constantly seeking 
to expand their living areas. The first neighborhoods to experience change in their 
demographic character are the ones closest to Ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods. The 
methods of demographic turnover are sophisticated in achieving the goal of driving out 
non-Haredi populations. In recent years, such trends encountered resistance from old-
time residents wishing to keep the neighborhood theirs. One such neighborhood, Kiryat 
HaYovel, became a symbol for resisting Ultra-Orthodox penetration. Several NGOs and 
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Municipality members backed and assisted neighborhood activists who fought this 
process, and it has currently come to a halt. 
The Ultra-Orthodox population is perceived as a “threat” because they are trying 
to have their norms, lifestyles, and needs set the terms of the public sphere. They are 
passionate in practicing their religion and keeping the various mitzvot, with Shabbat 
being one such core mitzvah. In many Jerusalem neighborhoods there are roadblocks on 
Shabbat to stop cars from entering their streets and defiling the holy day. Another issue 
is that of modesty. Women cover their bodies as the prevailing norms dictate. The levels 
of body covering vary in different communities. Men and women conduct many daily 
activities separately – studying and praying and sometimes using public transportation or 
walking the streets. There are strict dress codes for both sexes that indicate religious 
affiliation with precision. Having large families, they require services of public institutions 
like schools and clinics. Restaurants and food merchants in an Ultra-Orthodox 
neighborhood must be strictly kosher to suit potential buyers. 
When non-Haredim visit Ultra-Orthodox neighborhoods, they are expected to 
honor the norms of the place, particularly in terms of modesty and respect for Shabbat. 
Many non-Haredim do not wish to comply with these rules. Mostly, they are afraid of 
becoming a minority in an Ultra-Orthodox neighborhood that does not tolerate a public 
non-Haredi lifestyle. Most Ultra-Orthodox people, on their part, are even less keen on 
sharing space with non-Haredim, as they wish to preserve their lifestyle undisturbed. 
Since Ultra-Orthodox areas are overcrowded and costly, and as new housing 
units designated for Ultra-Orthodox are scarce, they are either forced out of the city, 
usually to less expensive towns in the occupied territories, or forced to move to non-
Haredi areas and Haredisize them, which they often do in an organized movement.11 
Ultra-Orthodox penetration usually starts with institutions: yeshivas, schools, or 
kindergartens. Such institutions are either built on vacant land or replace other 
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institutions. Either way, it requires formal land allocations from municipal committees, 
and therefore the municipal politics, heavily dominated by Ultra-Orthodox power, has a 
crucial role in these processes. 
Once an institution is established it attracts Ultra-Orthodox to the area. The fact 
that the Ultra-Orthodox, particularly Hassidic communities, have influential leaders, 
makes it easier for them to mobilize people to serve the collective good. Their rabbis 
might send a pioneer group to settle in a desired neighborhood, which might 
intentionally harass the neighbors in order to encourage them to sell and leave the 
neighborhood at this early stage, rather than postpone their decision and end up selling 
with great loss of value. Potential buyers would be other Ultra-Orthodox from the same 
community. In this fashion, one building after the other, they achieve a population 
turnover. Once the demographic change becomes fact, it forces the Municipality to 
allocate more institutions to serve the community. As this is a lengthy project, temporary 
institutions might sprout illegally to solve an immediate need, by turning private flats into 
synagogues, for instance, thus causing nuisance to other residents. 
Due to lack of space, the Municipality often allocates existing buildings for Ultra-
Orthodox institutions, thus replacing other institutions. Their educational institutions 
might replace formerly non-Haredi institutions that had lost their vitality. This forces 
non-Haredi families to move out and prevents new such families from moving in. The 
overall takeover of space would signal to non-Haredi residents that this place no longer 
belongs to them. Non-Haredi residents who take longer to leave might suffer financial 
loss due to decreasing housing values and lack of alternative buyers.12 
Kiryat HaYovel served as a warning sign for some of Baka‟s residents, who 
wished to avoid such a scenario. This called for close attention to indications of Ultra-
Orthodox presence or signs of their penetration. In 2009 the Municipality initiated a new 
master plan for Baka, as part of a larger municipal project, and residents were given a 
9 
chance to participate by forming their vision for the neighborhood. In March 2010, 
about 120 residents gathered at a public assembly in order to produce a written vision. 
Those who attended were mostly Israeli gentrifiers and veteran Anglo immigrants. The 
written vision they produced focused on issues of preservation of neighborhood 
architecture, social heterogeneity, communal atmosphere, and pluralism. 
My interviews and participant observation reveal that when Baka‟s residents said 
that they wanted the neighborhood to remain “pluralistic”, they meant that they wanted 
it to remain non-Haredi. The vision responded directly to the sources of threat that 
residents have already encountered in former battles (Ultra-Orthodox penetration, “the 
big money”, and the Municipality), and served as guidelines for the battles to come. It 
also provided activists with an important source of legitimation. The part of the vision 
that stated that Baka should remain pluralistic was influential in struggles against what 
residents interpreted as Ultra-Orthodox penetration. Two such cases form the empirical 
basis for this article. 
THE POLITICAL ARENA IN JERUSALEM 
Several actors comprise the political arena in Jerusalem, on the municipal and on the 
local levels. The political structure of Jerusalem includes the mayor and the City Council, 
comprised of 31 elected members (including the mayor). Local elections take place every 
five years. While the Palestinians of East Jerusalem are not Israeli citizens, they are still 
permanent residents of Israel eligible to vote and be elected in local elections (but not in 
the general elections). Yet, they boycott the local elections for political reasons. The City 
Council therefore includes Jews alone, who are only 63% of the city‟s inhabitants. During 
the research years, the City Council included 12 Ultra-Orthodox (39% of the Council). 
The current City Council (2013–18) includes 14 Ultra-Orthodox (45%). The over-
representation of the Ultra-Orthodox allows them great power and influence. The 
political and social agendas of Council members are significant in the policies in 
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promoting decisions that benefit their voters and are in accordance with their own 
lifestyles and values. Naturally, professional municipal employees are also highly 
influential by way of implementing policies, or failing to do so. 
Jerusalem also has an additional political structure, unique to this city – 
Community Councils, a type of local governance, which is a self-management framework 
at the local level.13 The ideas of local governance started in Britain during Thatcher‟s 
rule.14 It is based on voluntary activity of local residents that allows them greater 
involvement and influence. Local governance means a transfer of powers from the 
elected local authorities (e.g., municipalities) to other organizations (e.g., Community 
Councils). 
The Community Councils model began in Jerusalem in 1993, during the long 
tenure of Mayor Teddy Kollek. They are a collaboration between the Community 
Centers established in Jerusalem in the 1970s, which provided services, and the 
Neighborhood Administrations, established in the 1980s, that focused on civic 
participation. They were to finance civic participation, which require resources, from 
funds received from the public in exchange for the services provided by the Community 
Centers of which there are currently 30 in Jerusalem in each of the sectors: Palestinian, 
Ultra-Orthodox, and general. 
The municipal vision regarding the establishment of Community Councils 
resulted from the Municipality‟s desire to expand participatory democracy, to increase 
cooperation between the Municipality and residents, and to encourage residents‟ 
participation. The balance of power between the Municipality and the Community 
Councils does not allow them complete independence: the Councils maintain close ties 
with the Municipality, as they have to mediate between the Municipality and the residents 
on many issues. They are also highly dependent on the Municipality in terms of budget. 
The Councils consist of two entities – board members, democratically elected 
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neighborhood residents who serve in their jobs voluntarily, and paid employees. The 
managers are always paid professionals and must cooperate with the chairperson of the 
board, a volunteer resident. Councils provide services to residents and represent them in 
the Municipality and other bodies. The latter activity is done in collaboration with 
residents‟ forums. 
BAKA‟S COMMUNITY COUNCIL AND LOCAL ACTIVISTS 
The Baka Community Council includes six neighborhoods in Baka‟s vicinity. During the 
time of the research, elections to the board took place and drastically changed its 
composition. While Baka (one of six neighborhoods) was previously over-represented 
with 8 out of 12 board members, it could only have 3 out of 9 representatives in the 2011 
elections. Among Baka‟s representatives before the elections, 6 out of 8 were old-time 
Mizrahi residents (Jews originating in Muslim countries), which did not reflect the 
neighborhood‟s social composition. Baka‟s elected representatives in 2011 included a 
veteran Ashkenazi (from European descent) religious woman who had already served as 
chair of the board, and two men who were previously active on Baka‟s Urban Forum. 
Both were Ashkenazi gentrifiers, one religious and the other secular. 
Baka‟s Urban Forum was very active during my research. It convened 
sporadically as needed and discussed urban issues that affected this neighborhood and 
decided on the course of action in the matter. There were many changes in its 
composition, as regular participants moved out of the neighborhood and new members 
joined. The age of participants ranged between 35 and 70. Most permanent members, 
about 20, were men; the number of women increased when particularly burning issues 
were on the agenda. 
Members were generally highly educated professionals. Although most worked, 
they had relatively flexible work hours and could devote time for public activism. Most 
active members were Ashkenazim who moved into the neighborhood from the early 
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1970s, as part of its gentrification. They all owned the apartments where they lived. 
Activists comprised secular and religious equally. Baka‟s population included about 25% 
immigrants from Western countries, mainly from the US, France, and Britain. A 
significant number, beyond their proportion in the population, were native English-
speakers. These were more veteran immigrants who spoke good Hebrew. There were no 
French activists. All non-Anglo activists were born in Israel, but only a minority in 
Jerusalem. They acted out of deep sense of belonging, attachment, and commitment to 
the neighborhood and because they thought people should take responsibility for where 
they lived. Most had a long history of political and civic participation in different settings 
and on various issues. They all believed that citizens could influence their neighborhood 
and city, and that such influence called for active involvement. 
Only a small percentage of the public participates in public affairs. The research 
in the field of political participation explicitly states that such participation is more 
common among affluent residents,15 the more educated, people in their middle ages, and 
men.16 These findings are consistent with the profile of Baka‟s activists. Thus, cultural 
capital not only determines how people participate (how they “do politics”), but primarily 
– whether they participate at all. 
NEIGHBORHOOD CITIZENSHIP 
Baka becomes a “place” thanks to social relationships that residents have with each 
other. For many, it is a community and they have a deep sense of belonging to the 
neighborhood. This belonging creates commitment to place and willingness to act in 
order to ensure that the neighborhood keeps its character. Belonging and commitment 
have much to do with interests and NIMBYsm (Not In My Back Yard), and are related 
to issues of ethnicity and class. A sense of belonging combined with a commitment to 
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protect what residents see as theirs, create the political format I term “neighborhood 
citizenship”. Thus, residents effectively become citizens of their neighborhood. 
The neighborhood citizenship in Baka is a part of the worldwide change in the 
perception of citizenship, from citizenship based on duties (such as voting) to citizenship 
based on commitment and ongoing activities. Such a perception makes people look for 
different and more direct ways to influence policy.17 It is because people no longer trust 
their leaders to decide what is best for the public, and look for ways to participate in the 
decision-making process. 
In Israel, formerly a more collective society with a sense of statism, the 
fragmentation of society led most groups to promote their own interests. Residents‟ 
grassroots participation produces neighborhood citizenship. Citizenship, unlike 
belonging, requires a certain degree of activity and participation.18 Neighborhood 
citizenship is always in the making, evolving around the particular manner of residents‟ 
participation in local affairs. It does not replace other forms of citizenship, below or 
above the State, but exists parallel to them. However, it is distinct from the more 
researched form of local citizenship in the sense that while local citizenship addresses the 
city level, neighborhood citizenship addresses a level further below.19 
Current literature in Political Science seems more interested in the local level, 
perceiving democracy as an everyday praxis that “regular” people do all the time, in their 
places of work and education or in their neighborhoods. The literature on small-scale and 
local democratic practices – from the Netherlands,20 Brazil,21 Britain,22 and the US23 – 
reflects a growing interest from researchers around the world in explaining the locally-
based civic participation processes that they identify. Democratic practices at the 
neighborhood level are related but also distinct from the municipal level. Neighborhood 
citizenship refers to local governance institutions (like Community Councils) or to 
political organizations in the neighborhood, not to the municipality. This citizenship 
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evolves differently in different neighborhoods, due to the “mediating role” of place.24 
Different places experience different threats, problems, and forms of participation, 
according to their populations. 
Neighborhood citizenship is a small-scale democratic practice25 – politics with a 
small p that is mainly concerned with residents‟ quality of life.26 However, the issues 
arising in local conflicts often deviate from small p politics and concern “major” policy 
issues that belong in the realm of politics with a capital P. Such is the case for the 
religious politics discussed in this article that goes beyond Baka and concerns the 
religious and political relationships between Ultra-Orthodox and secular. Politics with a 
capital P is by no means more important than politics with a small p, rather these are two 
spheres operating simultaneously. Small p politics concerns the implementation of major 
policies in residents‟ everyday lives. 
Many find involvement on these issues on the local level more possible, 
accessible, and meaningful. As Vivien Lowndes argues, people naturally participate in the 
local sphere more than on the national level, because the former has a more immediate 
impact on their lives.27 They participate in order to influence and shape their surrounding 
and do so in any way that suits their character, way of life, and worldviews, and which 
they see as effective in promoting the issue at hand. Baka‟s active residents wish to 
influence the local agenda setting and to shape the future character of their 
neighborhood, particularly when they think it is threatened. 
CASE STUDY 1: THE CONFLICT OVER THE TAKEOVER OF PUBLIC LANDS 
BY HELEV HAARETZ, A HAREDI NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION 
The high demand for real estate in Baka from the 1990s onward left very few open 
spaces. Many desired the few temporarily vacant spaces. One such space was a public 
“brown” space at 14 Gideon Street. The color brown in master plans means a plot 
intended for public buildings. The original plan was to build a mikveh (ritual bath) there, 
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but later the Municipality built kindergartens instead. The plot, still an open space in 
2009, was near other public buildings and open spaces. These included a school, children 
nurseries run by the Community Council, another open space that used to serve as a 
community garden, a sports field and playground, and an old but active mikveh. 
That mikveh was on the top floor of a building, whose bottom floor served the 
non-profit organization Helev Haaretz (translated: The Fat of the Land). Helev Haaretz was 
operated by a Sephardi Haredi known in Baka as Rabbi Yair Ben-David who was never 
actually ordained as a Rabbi. He was not part of the established Haredi parties, such as 
Shas. His organization aided religious youth at risk and the needy, but also ran after-
school clubs and summer camps, both designated for children from the nearby area, 
usually from strong socio-economic background. Among Helev Haaretz‟s supporters were 
wealthier Anglo residents of Baka, and not just Haredi and/or Sephardim. 
Ben-David received permission to use this public building from the Municipality 
20 years previously. He had good contacts in the Municipality and still had powerful 
people there backing him up. In 2009 he expanded his presence from the main building 
to its immediate surroundings by building a small closed and fenced petting zoo on 
private property intended for development. The territory he invaded is to become an 
extension of the existing playground, as part of the public assignment that the 
entrepreneurs of a building project planned there agreed to do. Ben-David‟s invasion 
risked this future development. 
Shortly after the petting zoo, he expanded further, to the plot at 14 Gideon 
Street, across the street. That October, a high and locked fence was erected there. Upon 
enquiring who was behind it and for what purpose, eventually discovered that Ben-David 
was behind it. He wished to turn the empty plot into a community garden, and cultivate 
it in cooperation between his organization and the nearby School for Immigrant Youth.28 
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Although Ben-David did not go through the formal municipal bureaucratic channels 
necessary for the purpose of land allocation, he did however, receive permission from 
the head of the Municipality‟s Social Department, who most likely ordered the building 
of the fence too. He also received support from a friend, an old-time resident of Baka 
and at the time a board member in the Community Council. Although Ben-David was 
supported by this board member, he did not request formal approval from the Council, 
as required. 
This episode created a local drama. Residents were furious at Ben-David‟s 
appropriation of public lands without notice and disregarding regulations. They accused 
the Community Council, which strongly claimed it knew nothing about it, and that the 
one board member in question had acted on his own behalf. Residents, as well as the 
Community Council, sent angry letters to the general manager of the Municipality, the 
comptroller, and the mayor, demanding explanations and actions. Finally, in December 
there was a meeting onsite attended by the head of the Social Department, high-rank 
municipal employees, the heads of the Community Council, Ben-David, and several 
residents. 
I attended the meeting fraught with friction where accusations were thrown at 
each other. Running the meeting, the head of the Social Department announced that the 
meeting would continue in the Community Council offices, away from the furious 
residents. There, they reached an agreement to cut the high fence by half, keep it 
unlocked, and divide the land between Ben-David‟s organization, the School for 
Immigrant Youth, and the Community Council, allowing each of them to cultivate their 
own plots. The Jerusalem mayor later approved the agreement. 
Residents were deeply unsatisfied by the outcomes. They lambasted the events of 
14 Gideon Street that typified the Municipality‟s caving in under Ultra-Orthodox 
pressure and disregard of rules and regulations.29 In April 2010 on Israel‟s Independence 
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Day, residents who tried to enter the garden at 14 Gideon Street encountered a locked 
fence, contrary to the agreement. One resident wrote an angry email to neighborhood 
activists, “Pay attention to this insolence: An Ultra-Orthodox organization is trying to 
prevent neighborhood residents from using the community garden and celebrate 
Independence Day!” Ben-David‟s organization locked up the garden because they were 
Ultra-Orthodox and therefore were anti-Zionist, opposed to the existence of the State of 
Israel. Judging by his external appearance, Ben-David was Ultra-Orthodox, yet, according 
to his friend on the Community Council‟s board, was “open-minded” and even “served 
in the army”.30 
A resident told me in a May 2010 interview:  
I‟m afraid of the Haredization of this neighborhood. Sometimes I see Ultra-Orthodox 
people here and I drive them out. I tell them “get out of here”. Helev Haaretz is an Ultra-
Orthodox base with a desire to extend. I can see its imperialism. 14 Gideon Street is an 
excellent example. I don‟t see the danger as immediate, but there‟s no doubt we should 
stand guard if we don‟t want Baka‟s character to change. 
I argue that the focus of the conflict over 14 Gideon Street was the issue of 
public space, how to use it, by whom, and for what purposes. By taking part in shaping 
the neighborhood‟s public space, residents could determine the future of their 
neighborhood. The fact that they were not allowed to participate in this process made 
them feel powerless and run-over. The process of land allocation in this case was done 
covertly and improperly. The fact that it involved an Ultra-Orthodox organization caused 
this outburst. Ben-David‟s ability to get what he wanted and the support he received 
from high-rank people were interpreted by residents as another example of Ultra-
Orthodox power and influence over the Municipality. Ben David‟s “imperialist” 
aspirations were interpreted as an attempted Haredization, which must be fought.31 
Although this was not a Haredization in Kiryat HaYovel style and although it was not a 
classic Ultra-Orthodox-secular conflict, activists nonetheless chose to apply and use the 
Ultra-Orthodox threat in this conflict.  
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Although the improper process of land allocation would have been a sufficient 
cause for a battle, by stressing that it was done by an Ultra-Orthodox organization it 
mobilized people to participate and gained larger support. Although Ben-David had been 
a part of Baka‟s landscape for more than two decades and received support from various 
groups of residents, as a Haredi activist he was depicted as an invading outsider 
threatening the “pluralistic” character of the neighborhood. 
CASE STUDY 2: THE CONFLICT OVER THE OPERATION OF A CHABAD 
SUMMER CAMP IN THE PREMISES OF BAKA‟S COMMUNITY COUNCIL 
The conflict over the operation of a Chabad summer camp in the premises of Baka‟s 
Community Council began in June 2010, when residents saw pamphlets advertising this 
summer camp in Baka. The pamphlet stated that the summer camp was to take place in 
the premises of the Community Council. It was not the first year that Chabad operated 
their summer camp there. However, the reaction was fiercer because it followed the Helev 
Haaretz episode, which contributed much to the fear of Ultra-Orthodox penetration into 
Baka and portrayed it as an actual source of threat. The Helev Haaretz episode also gave 
rise to residents‟ increased criticism of the Community Council. Baka‟s residents, anxious 
to keep the neighborhood “pluralistic” character (meaning non-Haredi), decided to act 
against the Chabad summer camp on the Community Council‟s premises. 
Residents demanded explanations from the Community Council. The head of the 
Council explained that it tried to organize its own summer camp in its premises but 
failed, as registration was low. As the Council needed money for its regular activities, the 
management decided to allow Chabad, a “paying customer” that approached them with 
such request, to rent the premises and run its own summer camp there. This started yet 
another conflict in Baka framed as anti-Ultra-Orthodox penetration. 
Chabad‟s pamphlet clearly illustrated their agenda. The summer camp‟s name, for 
starters, was “Messiah Soldiers”. The pamphlet also stated that they would divide the 
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children into two separate groups – boys (referred to as “soldiers”) and girls. It also made 
clear that “The management reserves the right to expel a soldier if he behaves in a 
manner inappropriate to the summer camp‟s environment.” This served as weapons in 
the hands of neighborhood activists who believed that this Messianic religious group had 
no place in a “pluralist” neighborhood. 
Chabad is a global Messianic movement.32 Its agenda is to reinforce Jewish 
practices among Jews around the world and it does so by reaching out to Jews wherever 
they are.33 When it operates outside Israel, it mainly hopes to get Jews closer to Judaism, 
but when it operates in Israel its agenda is to promote a religious lifestyle. What Chabad 
does in order “to meet clients where they are” and “claim the street”,34 is to offer its 
services cheaper than the market prices for similar services, and this way get more people 
to participate.35 This was also the case for the Baka summer camp, which was remarkably 
cheaper than other summer camps in the area. This offer was attractive for many parents 
who struggled financially with arrangements for their young children during the long 
summer holidays, while they had to work. For some, the “cost” of exposing their 
children to Chabad‟s missionary agenda and contents and its ultra-religious customs and 
practices, was a small price to pay, while for others it may even have been an added 
bonus. 
Shortly before Chabad advertised its summer camp in Baka, a similar episode 
occurred in the nearby neighborhood of Gonenim, where the local Community Council 
also allowed Chabad to operate a summer camp from its premises. Massive pressure 
from residents and local politicians in that neighborhood prevented that summer camp 
from taking place. Baka‟s residents tried to achieve similar results. They started by writing 
emails to the Community Council demanding it to call-off the summer camp. By 
including many residents in the correspondence, those who wrote the emails hoped to 
raise awareness and gain large support. The first email was titled “Messiah Soldiers are 
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coming to the neighborhood: Who determines the character of the neighborhood?”36 It 
explained the nature of the issue and stated that allowing Chabad to operate on the 
Community Council‟s premises was against the principles of pluralism and tolerance, 
which the neighborhood‟s vision, written by many residents, promoted. Baka‟s activists 
argued that the Council must not allow a missionary organization to set foot in its 
premises, as the Council should represent and advocate the principles of pluralism and of 
religious tolerance, and not compromise this for money. 
Following a response from one resident who wrote that he did not think it 
problematic to let Chabad have its summer camp there, as long as the Council did not 
allow it a permanent “settlement”, another resident wrote, “We have to stop this thing, 
as these righteous men will not suffice in a summer camp. See the case of the petting zoo 
in Gideon Street. For them, an occupied territory shall not be returned.”37 
A clear link between the two events – the episode in Gideon Street and the 
Chabad summer camp – was made. The fear, expressed in this email, was that just like 
Helev Haaretz‟s successful takeover of public space, Chabad too could gain permanent 
access to the Community Council by operating a summer camp in its premises on a 
regular basis. The email suggested that if residents wished to prevent this from 
happening, they needed to act before facts were established, meaning before the summer 
camp took place. 
Another form of pressure on the Community Council was the recruitment of a 
member of the City Council, Pepe Alalo from the left wing secular Meretz party. Alalo 
was at one point the deputy of Mayor Nir Barkat, and was also a resident of a nearby 
neighborhood, one of the six neighborhoods comprising Baka‟s Community Council. 
Alalo emailed the manager of Baka‟s Community Council and asked him to keep Baka 
free (meaning free from religion) and pluralistic and not harm the existing status quo by 
allowing Chabad to take part in the Community Council‟s activities.38 
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Following these virtual forms of pressure, the Municipality addressed the matter. 
The head of the municipal Social Department (who had a role in the former conflict too) 
ordered the Community Council to reach a formal decision on the matter. The Council 
called a special meeting for 14 June and invited a couple of active residents as well as the 
organizer of Chabad‟s summer camp. The discussion was tempestuous. Some board 
members, veteran Mizrahi residents of Baka, attacked the secular activists, telling them 
that they did not represent the neighborhood and that Chabad offered a fair opportunity 
for the less economically fortunate residents of the neighborhood. The neighborhood did 
not belong to these activists, they said, but to all its residents, some of which were poor, 
and some were even Ultra-Orthodox. The summer camp‟s organizer clarified that he was 
organizing the camp at his own initiative and not on behalf of the Chabad movement, 
but that the camp would promote Chabad‟s agenda, which he agreed was missionary.39 
He also ran a Chabad center in Baka and was part of the Messianic group of Chabad. 
Yet, he was only associated with Chabad, and did not enjoy the formal support and 
recognition of the movement. Since he promoted Chabad‟s agenda, used its symbols, and 
acted as an integral part of the movement, the formality of his status and the nature of 
his association with Chabad were irrelevant. 
Finally, the Council decided to allow Chabad‟s summer camp to take place that 
summer, as time was pressing and canceling the camp would have harmed those who 
had already registered. However, in future years it would not allow Chabad, or people 
who promote its agenda, to run camps on the Community Council‟s premises. 
The decision to hold the summer camp that year fuelled the conflict. Some 
activists hung posters all over Baka, with a photo of the Lubavitcher Rabbi stating “He is 
not my Messiah”. The poster also explained that Chabad was working in every direction, 
social and public, in order to change Baka‟s character and other neighborhoods in the 
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area. It called upon residents who wished to keep their environment pluralist and open, 
to join an initiative calling to protect Baka from any missionary activities. It also called 
the Community Council to act upon its core principles: serve and represent the residents 
of that area by not allowing Chabad on its premises, as it did not represent the 
neighborhood and did not serve it, but rather promoted its own agenda. This conflict 
created yet another crisis of trust between residents and the Community Council. 
In the following year, 2011, Chabad tried to rent the Community Council‟s 
premises again for its yearly summer camp, but this time it was turned down. Although 
the pressure was unsuccessful in 2010, it proved successful afterwards and Chabad‟s 
summer camp did not become an established fact. Instead, the Community Council 
managed to run its own successful summer camps. Chabad did continue to operate 
summer camps in Baka, but in 2011–12 did so from a different, privately owned, 
location. 
However, on Passover 2013 Chabad managed to rent the other premises of the 
Baka Community Council (Beit Lazaros), located in a more deprived and religious 
neighborhood (the Talpiot projects). Once again Baka‟s secular activists mobilized to 
stop Chabad operating from a public space but were unsuccessful as Beit Lazaros was 
managed by an independent NGO that cooperates with the Baka Community Council 
whose manager and enjoyed independence. An article published on this battle in Yedi’ot 
Ahronot newspaper explains why the former battle was effective in preventing Chabad 
from renting the premises of the Community Council in Baka, but not in Talpiot.40 
This conflict was more of a “pluralist”-versus-Ultra-Orthodox conflict, and here 
too it was mostly about determining and shaping the neighborhood‟s public space. 
Although Chabad had operated in Baka before and has a center there, the conflict was 
not about their mere existence in Baka or their wider activities. At the core was that the 
summer camp was to take place on the premises of the Community Council, a public 
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institution that should reflect the way of life shared by most neighborhood residents. 
Although activists did not approve of Chabad‟s presence in Baka in general, they only 
fought against its attempts to set foot in Baka‟s representative institutions. This, I would 
argue, is due to the importance of the public sphere, and community institutions in 
particular, in determining the neighborhood‟s character and its future. The 
neighborhood‟s vision helped legitimize these battles and make them clear, focused, and 
easier to fight. It was harder to mobilize people to fight the other activities Chabad 
performed in public places: the above mentioned party in the local park, their yearly Lag 
Ba‟omer street parades, or the “mitzva tank” they place near the park from time to time 
to attract children inside to hear about Judaism in return for sweets. Here too, 
neighborhood activists, inspired by the vision of safeguarding “pluralism”, used the fear 
of Ultra-Orthodox penetration in order to mobilize participation and gain support. 
In Jerusalem, the term “pluralism” had come to mean non-Haredi. It replaced the 
exclusive term “secular”, which did not include Jerusalem‟s large religious and traditional 
population. The inclusive term “pluralist population” reflects the new alliance between 
the secular and religious residents. This unique coalition, particularly manifested in the 
work of the Yerushalmim NGO, does not exist elsewhere in Israel. It is driven by fear 
from the continuous Haredization of Jerusalem and a religious coercion that would 
further drive away the “productive populations” of the city (a commonly used term 
referring to those who work and pay taxes – non-Haredi). The fear that the Ultra-
Orthodox vision for Israel and Jerusalem particularly, is its transformation into a 
religious place run by their own leaders is not merely imagined by “pluralist” Jews, but 
also based on previous public declarations by Ultra-Orthodox leaders.41 
The Municipality, under Mayor Nir Barkat and his coalition, thought it right to 
reinforce the spatial separation between Ultra-Orthodox and others. It did so by 
protecting non-Haredi neighborhoods from becoming Haredi, through administrative 
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decision-making in issues of land allocation for instance. While this was not always 
successful, as the Ultra-Orthodox community enjoyed great power in the City Council, it 
was (and still is) the overall guideline. This is also reflected in the battle against the 
Chabad summer camp. Residents turned to municipal politicians and professionals, who 
intervened because the Community Councils and their premises are part of the municipal 
apparatus and by definition should reflect and represent the neighborhoods‟ characters. 
Although the framing of this conflict included the term “pluralism”, residents‟ 
interpretation of the meaning of pluralism varied. Some, like several board members, 
thought that a “pluralist neighborhood” meant a diverse neighborhood, in which there 
was room for everybody, including the Ultra-Orthodox. Their interpretation undermined 
the Jerusalemite use of the term “pluralism”. They exposed its non-inclusive nature, as a 
dichotomous term that envisioned two conflicting groups in the classic us/them fashion, 
and contrary to what pluralism generally meant. 
CONCLUSION 
Belonging is a significant issue in both of the described conflicts, as well as in other 
conflicts that took place in Baka during the research years. Belonging is tightly linked 
with space, as one always belongs to something, a particular place. The ethnography 
from Baka shows how important the public sphere is to people‟s sense of belonging. 
People demand to participate in shaping their immediate surroundings, as the public 
space reflects the character of the place and affects its future character. As Luke 
Desforges and co-authors argue, “Active citizens act for and within place-based 
communities and they are defined by place-based community.”42 Being defined by a 
place-based community also means that when people recognize themselves and the 
community of which they are part in the public space of where they live, their sense of 
belonging increases. When they do not recognize themselves there, they might feel 
estranged. 
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The main focus of the conflicts described above was residents‟ demand to shape 
the public space, in light of what they saw as signs of Ultra-Orthodox penetration into 
that space. The conflicts were framed in terms of anti-Haredization because in Jerusalem 
the fear of Haredization tends to successfully mobilize people. In the examples provided 
it helped generate legitimation and support and encouraged people to participate. It also 
went along with the neighborhood‟s vision. Public space is the “display window” of a 
place. People make assumptions about the character of a place based on the appearance 
of the public space. The streets, shops, people‟s appearance, architecture, local 
institutions, green spaces, cleanliness, and so on. 
What does a “sense of belonging” actually mean? As John Shotter argues, for 
people to have a sense of belonging to place, to feel “at home” there, they must live in a 
community which they sense as being “ours” rather than “theirs”, a community in whose 
construction they participate. They should feel invited to participate by virtue of who 
they are and feel that their efforts are welcomed and treated seriously. They should not 
feel they need to struggle to have their voices heard.43 Belonging is a positive sentiment 
that motivates people to become active citizens. 
Baka has been slowly gentrifying since the late 1960s and its population is 
heterogeneous. It includes various social groups of different ethnicities, levels of 
religiosity, political views, socio-economic status, levels of income or education, and 
number of years in the country and in the neighborhood. Heterogeneity, as appealing as 
it may be for many of Baka‟s residents (and even mentioned in the neighborhood‟s 
vision), also has its down sides, as the relationships between the various groups are 
fragile and tend to heat when conflicts arise. The public space, so vital in determining the 
neighborhood‟s character, accelerates existing social conflicts. As demonstrated 
throughout the article, the reasons for the acceleration of local social conflicts, 
particularly between the more secular gentrifying activists and the veteran Mizrahi 
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residents, were their different interpretations of the term “pluralism” and their different 
readings of what could be considered as Ultra-Orthodox penetration and whether this 
should be treated as a negative thing. 
The active residents‟ sense of belonging to Baka and their commitment to it led 
them to participate in neighborhood affairs in the hope to influence local affairs. When 
people feel that important decisions, which can influence their quality of life, are made 
behind closed doors without transparency, they become angry and distrust the system. 
The “system” in the cases analyzed here was the Community Council and the 
Municipality. A sense of belonging to place enhances a sense of commitment, while 
belonging and commitment together create the political format I term “neighborhood 
citizenship”. By being committed to determine the character of their neighborhood, 
residents became citizens of that neighborhood. 
Local activism makes extensive use of new media. Such media is useful in 
recruiting activists and effective in distributing and gathering information. It is also useful 
in creating active citizenship. People can state their opinions and feel that they have 
contributed without even leaving their house. Even the most passive activism enables 
people access to information on issues that might affect them, and provides an 
opportunity to participate. My ethnography from Baka shows just how such participation 
is done, both online and offline: how people gather information, distribute it, recruit 
others, convince, disagree, attack, and protest. Small acts that people do locally evolve 
into a broader trend: an active and involved public demanding responsibility over its life. 
While neighborhood citizenship differs from local (or urban) citizenship as the 
neighborhood and the Municipality may have conflicting interests, neighborhood 
citizenship is nonetheless linked to the municipal level. Baka is a part of the urban fabric 
of Jerusalem. Like other neighborhoods, it is affected by municipal decision-making, 
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urban trends, and current affairs. In relation to local battles, municipal actors are always 
present when residents oppose them or try to recruit them, cooperate with them, or 
depend on them for information or ruling. The Community Councils in Jerusalem form a 
bridge between residents and the Municipality and become another political level to 
consider. They may enhance or limit residents‟ actions and their ability to influence. 
There is a close link between neighborhood citizenship and public space. In fact, 
as argued by Beauregard and Bounds,44 the public space is essential for the creation of 
such citizenship. Local citizenship emerges in the public space because that is where daily 
activities occur and where people discuss things that concern them. Democracy is rooted 
in the public sphere, and develops there. The citizenship that emerges in the public 
sphere – in public places as well as in cyberspace, aims to promote public participation, 
and yet it is exclusive by nature. It excludes those who for various reasons have 
difficulties attending public meetings, those who lack technological literacy, and those 
who are not fluent in the native language. 
The Community Council, a body that should enhance participatory democracy 
and approach all local residents, is non-exempt from exclusion. Its employees set the 
dates and times of meetings, obviously never suited for all. Moreover, in the lack of other 
sources of information, their ability to reach out to participants is inevitably limited to 
the lists of people they already know and who had participated in their activities before 
(although this list is continuously growing). They also rely heavily on the Internet to 
disseminate information, and thus operate, if not out of malice, in an exclusionary 
fashion. Moreover, in meetings, discussions are often biased, as not all voices enjoy equal 
influence. Residents with higher cultural capital and long-term activists are more 
influential as they tend to express their opinions often and confidently and as others 
listen to them and tend to accept their opinions. 
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The conflicts described dealt with one of the major points of friction in Israeli 
society today – the Ultra-Orthodox population and its relationships with the broader 
society and with the State. What triggered these conflicts were spatial expressions of this 
issue and power struggles over the distribution of and control over public resources. 
Social frictions, I argue, are always place-related, and their core is in the public space and 
the struggle to define it. 
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